What Changed
- The conflict has entered a mutual energy destruction phase. Iranian strikes hit Saudi refineries in Riyadh, UAE gas facilities, and Kuwait gas facilities — the broadest geographic spread of energy targeting to date. US escalatory rhetoric now explicitly targets Iranian energy production infrastructure.
- Ras Laffan sustained physical infrastructure damage. Iranian missiles struck Qatar's Ras Laffan Industrial City, which handles approximately 20% of global LNG supply. The facility has been under force majeure since Day 4; physical damage now extends any restart timeline by weeks.
- Saudi Arabia has signaled a potential shift from defense to offense. Riyadh declared trust with Iran "completely shattered" and reserved the right to military action. Saudi entry as an active combatant would fundamentally change the scope of the conflict.
- Ceasefire pathways have narrowed further. The elimination of SNSC Secretary Ali Larijani — the most politically experienced figure capable of negotiating on behalf of the regime — removes a critical diplomatic bridge. No credible back-channel has been confirmed active since Day 17.
Five Locks
0/5 RESTORED
Five independent commercial conditions must be met simultaneously for a vessel to transit the Strait of Hormuz. The removal of any single condition makes transit commercially unviable. Assumes no state-sponsored insurance subsidy. Closest to restoring: H&M insurance. Furthest: crew consent.
From The Insurance War
Three-Layer Chokepoint
Three maritime routes connect Persian Gulf energy to global markets. Simultaneous disruption of all three would leave no viable export path. Hormuz: military clearing underway (130+ Iranian naval vessels destroyed), commercial transit near-zero (0/5 insurance locks restored).
From The Houthi Paradox
Houthi Escalation
Houthi posture toward Red Sea and Suez shipping. No kinetic action in 20 days, yet CMA CGM has suspended Suez sailings on the threat alone. Level 2 (targeting declarations) would be a significant escalation.
From The Houthi Paradox
Bold text indicates a value that changed since the previous update.
Key Metrics
| Metric | Current | Baseline |
|---|---|---|
| Days of conflict | 20 | Feb 28 |
| Five Locks restored | 0/5 | 5/5 |
| Ceasefire channels | Uncertain | — |
| US KIA | 13 | 0 |
| Iranian deaths (HRANA) | 3,114+ | 0 |
| D4: ~200 → D10: ~1,300 → D17: 3,114 | ||
| Lebanon deaths | 968 | 0 |
| Israeli deaths | 20 | 0 |
| Strait daily transits | Near-zero | 153 |
| D1: 153 → D10: 1–3 → D20: ~0 (Western-flagged) | ||
| Ships trapped in Gulf | ~650 | 0 |
| War-risk insurance | 5% hull | 0.25% |
| Pre-war: 0.25% → D4: 1% → D10: 3% → D15: 5% | ||
| Hormuz status | CLOSED (CLEARING) | OPEN |
| Iranian naval vessels destroyed | 130+ | 0 |
| Iranian BM launch rate (vs. Day 1) | −90% | 167/day |
| D1: 167 → D15: 4 → D20: targeted strikes only | ||
| Iranian drone rate (vs. Day 1) | −95% | 541/day |
| Ground troops in Iran | 0 | 0 |
HRANA: Human Rights Activists News Agency, independent Iranian casualty verification network. Military data from CENTCOM and IDF statements, cross-referenced against OSINT.
Commodities
| Commodity | Current |
|---|---|
| Brent crude | $113.71 |
| Pre-war: $82 → D10: $119.50 → D19: $107.38 → D20: $113.71 | |
| US gasoline | $3.58/gal |
| Pre-war: $2.93 → D19: $3.72 → D20: $3.58 | |
| Dutch TTF | €49.80/MWh |
| Pre-war: ~€28/MWh → D10: +76% → D20: €49.80 | |
| Urea | $674/t |
| Pre-war: ~$490 → D10: $492 → D15: $530 → D20: $674 | |
| EU gas storage | 46 bcm |
| 2024: 77 bcm → 2025: 60 bcm → D20: 46 bcm | |
| Gold | $4,602/oz |
| Pre-war: ~$3,050 → D15: ~$4,900 → D20: $4,602 (−6%, CME margin increase) | |
| VIX | 26.65 |
| Pre-war: ~15 → D20: 26.65 (+6.22% on day) | |
| VLCC spot rates | $423K/day |
| Pre-war: $50–70K/day → D20: $423K (record — non-Gulf routes) | |
| LNG tanker rates | +40%+ |
| Ras Laffan: force majeure (D4) + physical damage (D19) | |
| Helium supply offline | ~33% |
| Pre-war: 0% → D4: force majeure → D19: physical damage (Ras Laffan = 33% global) | |
| Cape rerouting | +112% vol. |
| Pre-war: baseline → D20: +112% volume, +10–14 days transit | |
Selected for direct disruption by the conflict. Pre-war baselines where available.
Supply Chain Risk Highlight
Helium → Semiconductor Disruption
Qatar's Ras Laffan supplies approximately 33% of global helium. EUV lithography — the process used to manufacture the most advanced semiconductors — requires helium for cooling. No commercially viable substitute exists. Taiwan's semiconductor industry sourced 69% of its helium from GCC nations in 2024. SK Hynix has disclosed a two-week operational buffer at current supply levels. Alternative sourcing from the US and Algeria can offset an estimated 50% of lost volumes.
Traces causal chains from physical disruptions to downstream economic effects. The helium-semiconductor dependency operates on a different timeline than headline energy prices.
Last updated: March 19, 2026 at 14:00 GMT. Updated daily from open-source intelligence and published reporting. This is not live data. Framework assessments are Second-Order editorial analysis. All claims cross-referenced against minimum two independent sources.